This paper proposes a novel measure of noise trading that aims to capture uninformed retail trading. The measure, an indicator of whether the firm placed advertisement(s) in the Wall Street Journal seven calendar days earlier, is motivated by evidence that retail trading spikes on ad days, that firms regularly place ads at weekly intervals, and that weekly ads frequently contain duplicate images. Instrumented retail trading is positively associated with informed trading and stock price efficiency, which suggests that informed investors anticipate increases in noise trading and trade accordingly.
Introduction
Noise trading is crucial in market microstructure models: simply put, trading would not take place without it (e.g., Kyle (1985) ; Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) ). Noise trading, as defined by these models, is uninformed.
1 Truly random buys and sells by liquidity traders fit this theoretical definition but are difficult to capture. Other potential proxies-retail and small trades-are shown to be sometimes informed (Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009) ; Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2009); Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2017) ), making them less-than-ideal measures of noise trading.
In this paper, we propose a new measure of noise trading that aims to capture uninformed retail trading. Specifically, we measure noise trading using an indicator of whether the firm placed an advertisement (ad) in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) seven calendar days earlier.
This measure exploits the rigidity in firms' print advertising timing-firms regularly place product ads at weekly intervals (Madsen and Niessner (2019) )-as well as evidence that retail trading spikes on ad days. We confirm both findings using a sample of 9,620 WSJ ad days by 238 U.S. public firms between 2009 and 2013. First, there is a high probability (42.4%) that a firm advertises on a given day if it advertised seven calendar days earlier, consistent with advertising rigidity. Second, both the number and dollar amount of retail trades, calculated using the method of Boehmer et al. (2017) , significantly increase on WSJ ad days. The spike in retail trading exhibits a cyclical pattern, repeating every five trading days, and thus mirrors firms' weekly advertising pattern. We find no significant increase in the number of retail trades immediately prior to ad days, increasing confidence that WSJ ads trigger retail trading.
2 To establish the relevance of our measure to retail trading, we document an increase of 34.5 retail trades (2.3% of the sample average) and $804,000 retail trading volume (3.5% of the sample average) seven calendar days after a WSJ ad day, with the largest effects occurring during the first and last trading hours.
1 We consider a trade uninformed if it is not motivated by information and is also insensitive to price. 2 Increased retail trading on ad days is consistent with Barber and Odean's (2008) finding that retail investors buy stocks that catch their attention, Madsen and Niessner's (2019) finding that Google searches for a firm's ticker rise on its ad days, and Liaukonyte and Zaldokas's (2019) finding that TV ads lead to increases in SEC EDGAR queries and Google searches for financial information.
We control for date and firm fixed effects, ad days with new images, days surrounding earnings announcements, other news days, market capitalization, and book-to-market.
Our measure arguably captures only uninformed retail trading for two reasons. First, advertising rigidity allows us to address the endogenous timing of ad placement, which may be correlated with firms' information events. It is unlikely that new information arrives every seven days or that firms intentionally bank information and release it on prescheduled ad days. Second, ads that are placed in the same newspaper every seven days likely contain minimal information content. To bolster this point, we perform image analysis using a combination of machine learning and manual verification. We find that WSJ ads placed seven days after a previous ad day have 61.8% probability of being a duplicate image of an ad that already appeared in the WSJ within the previous 60 days. Thus, while retail trading in response to general ads (or other information events) could be informed, retail trading in response to weekly recurring ads is likely uninformed and thus matches the theoretical definition of noise trading.
As an application of this measure, we study the association between noise trading and informed trading. Kyle (1985) shows that random noise trading provides camouflage, enabling informed traders to profit at the expense of uninformed traders. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) allow for discretionary noise trading and predict a similar effect of noise trading on informed trading. Subsequent theories show that noise trading stimulates informed trading by allowing large investors to build positions at a low cost to monitor firms (Kyle and Vila (1991) ; Kahn and Winton (1998) ; Maug (1998) ) and realize monitoring gains (Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) ). Additionally, noise trading prompts blockholders to acquire more information and trade aggressively on it, thus also increasing price efficiency (Edmans (2009) ; Edmans and Manso (2011) ).
Prior empirical research sheds light on these predictions by documenting a positive effect of stock liquidity on block formation and trading (e.g., Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) ; Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2014) ). Common liquidity measures, however, do not capture variation in just noise trading. Instead, these measures are typically functions of both uninformed and informed trading. 3 We thus revisit the effect of noise trading on informed trading using the ad-based measure as an instrument for noise trading. As discussed earlier, this instrument is positively correlated with retail trading but unlikely to affect informed trading other than through its correlation with uninformed retail trading. The instrument also addresses the concern that a potentially omitted firm characteristic is correlated with both retail and informed trading, as any such characteristic is unlikely to fluctuate every seven days. Furthermore, the cyclical pattern in weekly advertising and retail trading suggests that informed traders can anticipate ad days (and associated changes in uninformed trading) and trade to their profit. This does not require informed traders to have knowledge about the specifics of firms' ad contracts, only that they are able to discern patterns in retail trading induced by weekly recurring ads. The predictability of our measure allows us to identify a portion of noise trading that is anticipatable to informed traders, making a causal link from noise trading to informed trading possible.
We document a cyclical pattern in informed trading that resembles the pattern in retail trading, albeit less regular: both the number and dollar amount of informed trades (defined as non-retail trades of $50,000 or greater) increase on WSJ ad days and the five trading days before and after ad days. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions confirm a positive association between instrumented retail trading and informed trading-an increase of 34.5 instrumented retail trades (i.e., the increase associated with a WSJ ad seven days earlier) is associated with an increase of 14.3 informed trades (2.3% of the sample average), and an increase of $804,000 instrumented retail trading volume is associated with an increase of $2.2 million informed trading volume (2.6% of the sample average). Importantly, we control for the placement of a non-duplicate ad and continue to include a comprehensive set of controls and both date and firm fixed effects. 4 We interpret this result as informed traders rationally responding to expected and/or observed increases in noise trading, as predicted by market microstructure theories.
One alternative interpretation is that information released on WSJ ad days drives both retail and informed trades, making them correlated and inducing a positive bias (information hypothesis).
The use of the ad-based instrument alleviates this concern. A second alternative interpretation is that increased attention brought about by ads drives both retail and large non-retail trades, also inducing a positive bias. This would suggest that some large institutional trades are behavioral responses to attention (i.e., uninformed), which we view as less likely. We conduct two additional analyses to help rule out these hypotheses. First, we show that the positive relation between the ad-based measure and informed trading strengthens with the length of the firm's history of placing weekly recurring ads. Neither the information nor the attention hypothesis predicts this result.
Instead, it is consistent with our interpretation that informed traders rationally anticipate and exploit increases in noise trading, as a longer history of recurring ads should make it easier to discern a pattern in noise trading. Second, we show that the ad-based measure is positively associated with price efficiency, particularly for firms with a longer history of placing recurring ads. We follow Subrahmanyam (2005, 2008) and measure price efficiency as the inverse of the short-term return predictability of order imbalance. Inconsistent with the attention hypothesis, this result suggests that ad-induced uninformed retail trading prompts informed investors to trade and that their trading in turn accelerates the incorporation of private information into stock prices.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of noise trading and retail trading. Specifically, we show that the 2SLS results are robust to adding the existence of a WSJ ad fourteen calendar days earlier as a second instrument. This additional instrument is motivated by the observation that some firms advertise on a bi-weekly basis (Madsen and Niessner (2019) ). The results are also robust to using only retail trades of $5,000 or less.
This study adds to the existing literature in two ways. First, we contribute a novel measure of noise trading. Compared to the liquidity measures used in prior studies, our ad-based measure of noise trading has two advantages. First, our measure is primitive. Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) define liquidity simply as the volume of noise trader demand, and our measure exactly maps to this notion of liquidity. 5 Second, our measure is likely correlated with only uninformed retail trades and thus captures the essence of noise trading. These two advantages alleviate concerns that new information or other omitted firm characteristics drive both uninformed and informed trading and allow us to more forcibly establish a causal link from noise trading to informed trading. Our results show that informed traders strategically time their trades to expected and/or observed noise trades, and their trading in turn improves stock price efficiency.
These results complement previous findings of a positive effect of stock market liquidity on block formation and trading (e.g., Edmans et al. (2013) ; Norli et al. (2014) ).
The uninformed nature of our measure also makes it unique compared to non-liquidity based measures of noise trading. For example, retail trades are sometimes informed (Boehmer et al. (2017) ) and small trades can result from order splitting by informed traders (Barber et al. (2009); Brandt et al. (2009) ). Greene and Smart (1999) use the coverage of a stock in WSJ's "Investment
Dartboard" column as a shock to noise trading, and find an increase in trading volume and a decrease in bid-ask spreads following the coverage. Although such coverages may drive mostly uninformed retail trading, lingering endogeneity concerns remain since this column is dedicated to publishing stock recommendations written by financial analysts. In contrast, our ad-based measure is arguably uninformed, generalizable, and potentially applicable in wider contexts.
By deriving a measure of noise trading from product ads, we also contribute to a growing literature on the financial market implications of corporate advertising. In addition to the aforementioned studies that document an effect of print and TV ads on investor attention, prior research finds that annual advertising expenditures are negatively associated with trading costs and price impact (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) ), and positively associated with breadth of ownership (Grullon et al. (2004); Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) ), stock returns (Boyd and Schonfeld (1977) ; Chemmanur and Yan (2011); Lou (2014) ), and firm value (Gurun and Butler (2012) ). In contrast, we focus on daily ads and their effect on uninformed/informed trading and price efficiency.
depth, and resiliency. To capture this notion of liquidity, empirical literature typically uses either trading cost-or price impact-based measures. Some studies also utilize shocks that arguably increased one property of liquidity (such as decimalization as a shock to tightness in Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) and financial crises as a shock to resiliency in Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) ).
Data, variable measurement, and descriptive statistics
This section describes data, defines the main variables, and provides descriptive statistics for the sample. Detailed variable definitions are in appendix A.
Ad days
We obtain ad data from MediaRadar Ad Sales Research Database, which covers ads published in a wide range of daily newspapers between February 2008 and October 2013. Compared to TV and online ads, print ads have a longer shelf life and their placement (both date and location)
can be easily measured. Although readership of print newspapers has declined, the remaining subscribers represent the most engaged readers, a desirable feature for corporate advertisers.
Given our interest in how recurring ads affect trading, we focus our analysis on ads placed in the WSJ for three reasons. First, the WSJ is one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the U.S. With 1.4 million print copies sold daily in 2013, 6 the journal captures a significant amount of the ads covered by MediaRadar. Second, the WSJ is the most influential business newspaper in the U.S., so presumably, its subscribers are keen to learn about business and economics news and comfortable with trading. Third, focusing on one newspaper helps ensure that recurring ads contain minimal information content, particularly if these ads result from multi-week contracts.
To assess the effect of advertising on trading, we align each ad day in the WSJ to a trading day. While a majority of the sample ads (94%) fall on trading days, a small fraction are placed in the WSJ weekend issues and on holidays (i.e., non-trading days). We align each non-trading ad day to its first subsequent trading day, although inferences do not change if we remove these ads.
We define an indicator for ad days, Ad t , to equal one if the firm placed an ad in the WSJ on day t, and zero otherwise.
Retail trading and informed trading
To construct measures of retail and informed trading, we retrieve intraday trading data from the Trade and Quote database (TAQ). We follow Boehmer et al. (2017) to detect retail trades.
Their methodology exploits the fact that marketable retail orders are primarily executed either via internalization (i.e., filled from the broker's own inventory) or by wholesalers. These retail orders are often associated with a small price improvement (typically 0.01, 0.1, or 0.2 cents)
relative to the National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO). In contrast, institutional orders, executed through either exchanges or dark pools, are generally prohibited from sub-pennying pricing after the decimalization of tick size in 2001. One exception is that institutional orders are allowed to be executed at the midpoint of the NBBO, so some are printed at 0.5 cents. Further, some institutional trades are printed at 0.4, 0.5, or 0.6 cents, which result from a dark pool that for a time allowed some negotiation around the midquote. To proxy for informed trades, we identify non-retail trades of $50,000 or more; the choice of using $50,000 as the cutoff level follows Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) and Barber et al. (2009 
Control variables
One important control that we include in our multivariate analyses is an indicator for WSJ ads that are not duplicate images of a previous ad. We create this indicator in three steps.
First, we capture the image of every WSJ ad in our sample. Second, we apply Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) and Speed Up Robust Feature (SURF), two common feature detection algorithms in computer vision, to compare each ad's image (Ad i ) to images of previous ads placed by the firm for the same brand (Ad j =i ). These algorithms take an image and transform it into a "large collection of local feature vectors" known as keypoints (Lowe (1999) 
Summary statistics
We restrict the sample to U.S. domiciled firms with exchange-listed common shares. After Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample. To ease the presentation of coefficient estimates in the regression analyses reported below, we divide the number of trades by one hundred and dollar trading volume by one million.
An average firm-day in our sample is associated with 1,491 retail trades and $23.1 million in retail dollar volume. The average retail trade size is 348.5 shares or $13,725, with the latter number falling within the interquartile range of $2,000 to $25,000 quoted by Boehmer et al. (2017) for a confirmed to be non-duplicate images, and 97% of the ads for which both techniques produce similarity measures greater than 15 are confirmed to be duplicate images. Since we manually check all ads for which at least one of the techniques produces a similarity measure between 5 and 15, results are not sensitive to using cutoff levels that are close to these thresholds.
larger sample of firms. The average trade size is also consistent with the observation by Boehmer et al. (2017) that retail trades are not necessarily small and sometimes informed. In Section 5, we report results using modified measures of retail trading that limit trade size to $5,000 or less.
As expected, informed trades are significantly larger than retail trades. In our sample, an average firm-day is associated with 622.6 informed trades and $85.7 million in informed dollar volume,
with an average trade size of 7,249 shares or $177,260. Finally, our sample firms tend to be large, with an average market capitalization of $14.2 billion and a book-to-market ratio of 0.78.
Empirical results

Ad days and retail trading
We start by examining patterns in retail investors' trading around ad days. Figure 1 plots the average number of retail trades and retail dollar volume from trading day -7 to trading day 7, with day 0 representing the 9,620 WSJ ad days in our sample. The first pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that both the number and dollar volume of retail trades spike on ad days. Extending this result to multivariate regression, we study the relation between ad days and retail trading by estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model:
Again, the sample is at the firm-trading day level, with subscript t indexing day and the subscript for firm omitted for brevity. The dependent variable is one of the three measures of retail trading, all defined in Section 2.2, and the key independent variable is Ad t . Controls t includes those discussed in Section 2.3, date fixed effects to control for time-series variation in retail trading due to common shocks (such as market conditions), and firm fixed effects to control for firm-level heterogeneity in advertising and retail trading. To examine when the increase in retail trading occurs and how long it lasts, we also include indicators for the days immediately before and after ad days. Specifically, we include n Days Before Ad t (which denotes whether trading day t is the n th trading day before a subsequent ad day, with n = 1, 2) and n Days After Ad t (which denotes whether day t is the n th trading day after a previous ad day, with n = 1, 2).
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In all regressions henceforth, we cluster standard errors by trading days.
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Columns (1)- (3) of Table 2 report the regression results of equation (1) is positive in all three columns and significant at the 5% or 1% level, confirming the univariate observation that retail trading increases on ad days. In terms of economic significance, an average WSJ ad day is associated with an increase of 27.6 retail trades and $844,000 retail trading volume, and an increase of 1.7% in the first principal component of retail trading.
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Compared to Ad t , the indicators for adjacent ad days are generally less significant. Specifically, the two indicators denoting whether trading day t is immediately before an ad day, i.e., 2 Days
Before Ad t and 1 Day Before Ad t , are insignificant in Columns (1) and (3); a one-tailed t-test shows that the coefficient estimate on Ad t is significantly larger than the coefficient estimates on both of these indicators. Although the indicators for days before an ad day are significant in Column (2), their coefficient estimates are much smaller in magnitude than the coefficient estimate on Ad t .
This result is reassuring: if ads trigger retail trading, we should not expect a rise in retail trading before ad days. In contrast, the two indicators for days immediately after an ad day are generally significant. 1 Day After Ad t is significant in all three columns, and the magnitude of its coefficient estimate is comparable to the coefficient estimate for Ad t . 2 Days After Ad t is significant in two out of the three columns, albeit with a smaller magnitude. The results suggest that ad-induced retail trading persists for two trading days (day 0 and 1) and starts to fade on day 2.
Examining the controls related to firms' earnings releases, we find that the indicators for quarterly earnings announcement days and the two days before and after earnings announcements are highly significant in all three columns, consistent with earnings releases significantly influencing market expectations and trading (Kothari (2001)). The coefficient estimate on QEA t , the indicator for earnings announcement days, also provides a useful benchmark for Ad t . The increase in the number of retail trades on ad days is 1/40 th of the increase on earnings announcement days (27.6
vs. 1,101.8), and the increase in the retail dollar volume on ad days is 1/23 rd of the increase on earnings announcement days ($844,000 vs. $19.7 million). Thus, the increase in retail trading on ad days is economically meaningful but also plausible.
Turning to the remaining controls, the indicator for other news days is positively associated with all three measures of retail trading, but as expected, its coefficient estimate is much smaller in magnitude than the coefficient estimate on QEA t . Market capitalization is negatively associated with the number of retail trades but positively associated with retail dollar volume and the first principal component of retail trading. This result suggests fewer but larger retail trades, on average, for larger firms. Book-to-market is negative in all three columns, suggesting that retail investors tend to chase growth firms.
The second pattern that emerges from Figure 1 is that retail trading increases on the five trading days (typically corresponding to seven calendar days) before and after ad days, exhibiting a cyclical pattern. The two patterns observed from Figure 1 , combined with prior evidence that firms frequently place product ads at weekly intervals (Madsen and Niessner (2019) ), suggest the possibility that the cyclical spike in retail trading reflects retail investors' attention to weekly recurring ads. To explore this possibility, we first examine the timing of WSJ ads in our sample. Table 3 Panel A shows that conditional on a firm placing an ad in the WSJ on calendar day t − 7, the probability of the firm placing an ad on calendar day t is 42.4%. In contrast, the probability that the firm places an ad any other day during the week is only 7% -12.1%.
The same pattern holds for duplicate ads as well as non-duplicate ads, with both types frequently placed every seven days. Importantly, there is a high probability of observing a duplicate ad in the WSJ on a given day if the firm also placed a WSJ ad seven calendar days earlier. Conditional on a firm placing WSJ ads on both day t − 7 and day t, the probability that the ad already appeared in the WSJ within the previous 60 days is 61.8% (i.e., 26.2%/(26.2%+16.2%)).
This pattern supports our conjecture that ads placed in the WSJ every seven days likely contain minimal information content.
We also examine the frequency of the 10,225 individual ads in our sample by days of the week in (1982)). We also include date fixed effects in all regression analyses to help address any unobservable differences across days of the week.
Recurring ad days and retail trading
The previous section shows that (1) retail trading spikes on WSJ ad days; (2) the cyclical spike in retail trading that takes place every five trading days corresponds to the weekly pattern in firms' ads placement; and (3) weekly ads frequently contain duplicate images. Building on these findings, we introduce an instrument for noise trading: the existence of a WSJ ad seven calendar days earlier. Intuitively, this instrument is designed to capture the increase in retail trading induced by weekly recurring ads, which is arguably uninformed. We verify the relevance of the instrument by estimating the following OLS model, which we use as the first-stage regression of a 2SLS analysis linking instrumented retail trading to informed trading:
The dependent variable is one of the three measures of retail trading for trading day t. The instrument Ad t−7 equals one if the firm placed an ad in the WSJ seven calendar days earlier and zero otherwise. We continue to include the control for ad days with non-duplicate images, basic controls, as well as date and firm fixed effects. (2)- (3) and the 20% maximal bias of the instrumental variable estimator relative to OLS in Column (1). In terms of economic significance, the existence of an ad seven days earlier is associated with an increase of 34.5 retail trades (2.3% of the sample average) and $804,000 retail trading volume (3.5% of the sample average), and an increase of 1.8%
in the first principal component of retail trading (also comparable to the standardized change in the number and dollar volume of retail trades). Coefficient estimates on the controls are similar to those reported in Table 2 . In particular, the coefficient estimate on N on-duplicate Ad t is positive in all three columns and statistically significant in Columns (2)-(3), which suggests that ads with non-duplicate images stimulate more trading by retail investors. More importantly, controlling for ad days that release non-duplicate images or removing them does not affect the positive relation between Ad t−7 and retail trading.
Ad days and informed trading
In this section, we examine the effect of noise trading on informed trading. We start with a univariate analysis that plots the average number and dollar volume of informed trades (defined as non-retail trades of $50,000 or greater) for the 15-day window centered on WSJ ad days. If informed traders rationally anticipate the increased noise trading on ad days and trade to their profit as theory predicts, then we expect to see a pattern in informed trading similar to the pattern in retail trading. As expected, Figure 2 illustrates a cyclical pattern in informed trading: both measures of informed trading increase on ad days and the five trading days before and after ad days. Although this pattern is less regular than the pattern from Figure 1 , the similarity between the two suggests that informed traders likely take into account retail traders' response to recurring ads, and trade accordingly.
One alternative interpretation of the pattern illustrated above is the information hypothesis: if information drives both retail and informed trades on ad days, then this will induce a positive bias.
A less obvious alternative interpretation is the attention hypothesis: if increased attention brought about by ads drives both retail and large non-retail trades (our proxy for informed trades), then this will also induce a positive bias. These alternative interpretations present endogeneity challenges.
We first use an instrumental variable approach to help rule out the information hypothesis, and then conduct additional analyses in Section 4 to address both hypotheses.
We estimate a 2SLS model using the existence of an ad seven days earlier as an instrument for uninformed retail trading. As shown earlier, the instrument is highly correlated with retail trading, thus satisfying the relevance criterion. Given the repetitive nature of weekly recurring ads, which is the main motivation of the instrument, it is unlikely correlated with informed trading except through its correlation with uninformed trading (the exclusion restriction). The first-stage of the 2SLS model is specified in equation (2) and the second-stage is specified below as:
where Fitted Retail Trading is the fitted value of Retail Trading from equation (2) and controls are previously defined. Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (3) and confirms a positive association between instrumented retail trading and informed trading. The economic magnitudes from the 2SLS analysis suggest that an increase of 34.5 instrumented retail trades (i.e., the increase associated with an ad seven days earlier from Table 4 ) is associated with an increase of 14.3 informed trades (2.3% of the sample average), and an increase of $804,000 instrumented retail trading volume is associated with an increase of $2.2 million informed trading volume (2.6% of the sample average).
An interquartile increase in the principal component of retail trading is associated with an increase of 483.5 informed trades and $74.5 million informed trading volume.
Noticeably, N on-duplicate Ad t is insignificant in all columns. This result casts doubt on the two alternative interpretations: although new ads trigger more retail trading, they do not appear to directly motivate large trades by institutional investors, making it less likely that these trades are responses to either the information contained in the WSJ ads or the attention brought about by them. Instead, it supports our interpretation that informed traders exploit expected and/or observed increases in noise trading on recurring ad days and trade accordingly. For the remaining controls, size and book-to-market are both positively related to informed trading. Indicators for days surrounding earnings announcements and other news days are insignificant. 
Ad days and intraday trading
In this section, we examine intraday trading intervals to more precisely measure when informed traders react to recurring ad-induced noise trading. To do so, we divide a regular trading day into six one-hour intervals and one thirty-minute interval, namely We continue to hypothesize a positive relation between recurring ad days and retail trading in each of these intervals. We run a 2SLS model with the first-stage specified below as:
Subscript t indexes day and subscript k indexes trading intervals. For brevity, we measure retail trading using only Retail Trading PC, which integrates both the number of retail trades and retail dollar volume. If the increase in retail trading on recurring ad days is a behavioral response to attention, then we expect to see a positive β across all trading intervals. Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (4) and provides additional evidence that recurring ads induce noise trading. Consistent with our expectations, β is significantly positive in all seven columns, suggesting that the increase in retail trading on recurring ad days occurs throughout the day, with the largest effects occurring during the first and last trading hours. As the WSJ is published and available before markets open, this pattern is consistent with at least some retail traders immediately responding to recurring ads. N on-duplicate Ad t is also positive in all seven columns and statistically significant for three time intervals, suggesting that ads with new images trigger incremental retail trading.
The second-stage of the 2SLS model is specified below as: Table 7 reports the results of estimating equation (5) and shows a positive association between instrumented retail trading and informed trading in six out of the seven trading intervals. Informed traders' response to recurring ad-induced retail trading is the most pronounced during the first trading hour, when ad-induced retail trading is also high. N on-duplicate Ad t is negative in all columns, and marginally significant in two. Again, this result is inconsistent with the alternative interpretations that the increase in informed trades on recurring ad days is a response to information released by the firm or a result of increased attention.
Additional analyses for alternative interpretations
In this section, we conduct two additional analyses to further shed light on the information and attention hypotheses.
Length of advertising history
First, we examine whether the positive relation between our measure and informed trading varies with the length of the firm's history of placing recurring ads. Arguably, a longer history of recurring ads makes it easier for informed investors to discern a pattern in noise trading. If informed traders are able to anticipate increases in noise trading on recurring ad days ex ante, then they would have incentives to acquire more information about the firm and trade more aggressively on that information ex post (Edmans (2009), Edmans and Manso (2011) ).
To test this premise, we first calculate, conditional on the firm placing an ad in the WSJ seven calendar days earlier (i.e., Ad t−7 = 1), the frequency (in weeks) of the firm placing recurring ads at weekly intervals during the twelve weeks prior to day t − 7. The sample median of this frequency is three weeks. We then define two separate measures: Ad t−7, long history , which equals one if the firm placed an ad in the WSJ seven calendar days earlier and also placed recurring ads at weekly intervals for at least three of the prior twelve weeks, and zero otherwise; and Ad t−7, short history , which equals one if the firm placed an ad in the WSJ seven calendar days earlier and also placed recurring ads at weekly intervals for less than three of the prior twelve weeks, and zero otherwise.
We study the relation between these two measures and informed trading by estimating the following OLS model:
Inf ormed T rading t = α + β 1 Ad t−7, long history + β 2 Ad t−7, short history + γControls t + t . (6) Table 8 reports the regression results of estimating equation (6). As shown, the coefficient estimate on Ad t−7, long history is significantly positive in both columns, whereas the coefficient estimate on Ad t−7, short history is insignificant. This result is consistent with our interpretation of informed trading being a rational response to increased uninformed retail trading on ad days, as a longer history of recurring ads makes it easier for informed investors to form rational expectations of recurring ad-induced noise trading. It is inconsistent with the two alternative interpretations, as a positive correlation between the ad-based measure and informed trading, induced by either information or attention, should not vary with the length of the recurring ad history.
Ad days and stock price efficiency
Second, we assess the effect of recurring ad days on stock price efficiency. Our interpretation of the results suggests a positive association between the ad-based measure and price efficiency. If informed traders rationally anticipate increased noise trading on recurring ad days and trade to their profit, then their trading should incorporate private information about the firm into price and enhance price efficiency. In contrast, the attention hypothesis would imply no effect of the measure on price efficiency, as the large non-retail trades would themselves be uninformed. Subrahmanyam (2005, 2008) show that the capacity of an asset market to accommodate order imbalances is inversely related to the short-term predictability of stock returns from previous order flows, and propose an approach to measure price efficiency based on this relation. Following their approach, we first calculate a measure of order imbalance, OIB$, the dollar amount paid by buyer-initiated trades minus the dollar amount received by seller-initiated trades divided by the dollar volume of trading. Trades are classified as buyer-or seller-initiated using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. We then match OIB$ to stock returns. Our sample is at the firm-day level. To avoid artificially inflating sample size and t-statistics, we limit the calculation of OIB$ to the first hour of each trading day (when informed traders' response to retail trading is strongest, see Table 7 ), i.e., over the eleven five-minute intervals from 9:30 to 10:25 ET, and match them to the corresponding Stock Return over the eleven five-minute intervals from 9:35 to 10:30 ET. Stock Return are stock returns calculated using the midpoints of the best bid and offer. This procedure yields a sample of 1,494,432 observations at the firm-trading interval level.
We study the relation between the ad-based measure and price efficiency by estimating the following OLS model:
Subscript t indexes day and subscript k indexes five-minute trading intervals. OIB$ measures order imbalance, and Ad t−7 and controls are previously defined. Chordia et al. (2008) use the coefficient estimate on OIB$, η, to capture the degree of price inefficiency, with a more positive value ofη indicating less price efficiency. If the increase in informed trading is a rational response to increased noise trading on recurring ad days, then we predict β < 0; that is, we expect the ad-based measure to be positively associated with price efficiency (or negatively associated with price inefficiency) and thus decrease the return predictability of order imbalance. Table 9 Column (1) reports the regression results of estimating equation (7). With both date and firm fixed effects included, OIB$ is positive but statistically insignificant. Importantly, the coefficient estimate of interest, β, is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. In
Column (2), we modify equation (7) by separating Ad t−7 into Ad t−7, long history and Ad t−7, short history and include the interactions between these two measures and OIB$. Similar to the results in Table 8 , the interaction between Ad t−7, long history and OIB$ is significantly negative, whereas the interaction between Ad t−7, short history and OIB$ is statistically insignificant. These results suggest that recurring ads induce informed trading and enhance price efficiency, particularly for firms with a longer history of placing recurring ads.
To examine the sensitivity of these results to other lagged ad days, we repeat the analyses in Column (1) of Table 9 , replacing Ad t−7 with Ad t−n , which equals one if the firm placed an ad in the WSJ n calendar days earlier and zero otherwise, n = 5, 6, 8, 9. The results are reported in Table   IA1 of the Internet Appendix. For the ease of comparison, we reproduce the results with Ad t−7
from Column (1) of Table 9 . Interestingly, only the coefficient estimate on the interaction between order imbalance and Ad t−7 is significantly negative, which further supports our interpretation of increased price efficiency driven by trading on recurring ad days.
The results in this section are thus inconsistent with the attention hypothesis. Rather, they are consistent with either our interpretation that recurring ad-induced noise trading prompts informed investors to trade and their trading enhances price efficiency, or the information hypothesis.
Robustness checks
We conduct two additional analyses to check the robustness of the main results in Section 3 to alternative definitions of ad-based instruments and alternative measures of retail trading. Some of these robustness tests also shed light on the two alternative interpretations. First, we add Ad t−14 , the existence of a WSJ ad fourteen calendar days earlier, as a second instrument for noise trading. This instrument is motivated by the finding in Madsen and Niessner (2019) that some firms advertise at bi-weekly intervals. We rerun the 2SLS model in Tables 4-5, using both Ad t−7
and Ad t−14 as instruments for noise trading. for the joint significance of the two instruments is well below 1%. Importantly, we continue to observe a positive association between instrumented retail trading and informed trading. Although
IV exogeneity cannot be conclusively tested, the Hansen's J-statistic for the test of overidentifying restrictions is insignificant. This provides some comfort. Assuming that one of the two instruments is a valid IV, we cannot reject the null of no correlation between the other instrument and the 2SLS residuals.
As a second robustness check, we modify the retail trading measures by limiting trade size to $5,000 or less. Boehmer et al. (2017) find that retail trades can be sizable and sometimes informed, which motivates our use of an instrument for uninformed retail trading. Limiting the sample to only small retail trades further helps rule out the information hypothesis. The results with the modified retail trading measures are reported in Tables IA4-5 
Conclusion
Noise trading is a standard feature in market microstructure models but tricky to empirically measure. Common liquidity measures are typically functions of both noise and informed trading.
Non-liquidity based measures of noise trading, such as small and retail trades, are sometimes informed themselves. Motivated by evidence that retail trading spikes on ad days, that firms regularly place ads at weekly intervals, and that weekly ads frequently contain duplicate images, we introduce a novel measure of noise trading: an indicator of whether the firm placed an ad in the Wall Street Journal seven calendar days earlier.
We revisit the effect of noise trading on informed trading using the ad-based measure as an instrument. We show that the instrument is positively associated with daily and intraday retail trading, after controlling for date and firm fixed effects, firm characteristics, ad days with new images, and earnings and news releases. This significant association establishes the relevance of this instrument to retail trading. The repetitive nature of weekly recurring ads makes our instrument plausibly exogenous to informed trading other than through its correlation with retail trading. We find that instrumented retail trading is significantly positively related to large institutional trades, our proxy for informed trading, after including the controls as well as date and firm fixed effects.
To the extent that our instrument captures exogenous variation in noise trading, these results suggest that informed traders rationally respond to noise trading. However, information or attention could also induce an endogenous positive relation between retail and informed trading.
We conduct two additional analyses to further rule out these alternative interpretations. First, we
show that a longer history of the firm placing weekly recurring ads strengthens the positive relation between the ad-based measure and informed trading. This result is inconsistent with either the information or the attention hypothesis. Second, we show that the ad-based measure is positively related to stock price efficiency, particularly for firms with a longer history of placing recurring ads, which is inconsistent with the attention hypothesis. Additional tests show that our results are robust to adding a second instrument to indicate the existence of a WSJ ad fourteen calendar days earlier or using measures of retail trading that limit trade size to $5,000 or less.
Overall, the results support the theoretical predictions and highlight one important financial market implication of corporate advertising: ads influence retail and institutional investors' trading behavior and market efficiency. More broadly, our instrument-the existence of a product ad seven calendar days earlier-represents a primitive measure of noise trading that captures the uninformed essence of noise trading that is generalizable to other contexts. Natural logarithm of market capitalization (abs(PRC) × SHROUT) at the end of quarter q − 1.
Book/M arket q−1
The ratio of book value of assets to market value of assets, calculated as total assets (ATQ) divided by [market capitalization plus total liability (LTQ)], both at the end of quarter q − 1.
Measures of price efficiency OIB$ t,k
The dollar amount paid by buyer-initiators minus the dollar amount received by seller-initiators divided by the dollar volume of trading, calculated over one of the eleven five-minute intervals from 9:30 to 10:25 ET.
Stock Return t,k+1
Stock return, calculated using the midpoints of the best bid and offer over one of the eleven five-minute intervals from 9:35 to 10:30 ET.
Figure 1 Retail Trading Surrounding Advertisement (Ad) Days
This figure plots the average number (solid line) and dollar volume (dashed line) of retail trades, from seven trading days before to seven trading days after ad days (day 0). Retail trades are defined using the Boehmer et al. (2017) classification. The sample comprises 9,620 ad days by 238 firms in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) between April 2009 and October 2013.
Figure 2 Informed Trading Surrounding Ad Days
This figure plots the average number (solid line) and dollar volume (dashed line) of informed trades, from seven trading days before to seven trading days after ad days (day 0). Informed trades are defined as non-retail trades of $50,000 or greater. The sample is the same as in Figure 1 . This table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results on the relation between ad days and retail trading. Ad t indicates days with an ad in the WSJ, n Day(s) Bef ore Ad t are set equal to one if the firm placed an ad in n trading days and zero otherwise, and n Day(s) Af ter Ad t are set equal to one if the firm placed an ad n trading days earlier and zero otherwise, n = 1, 2. Retail trading is measured using Number of Retail Trades in column (1); Retail Dollar Volume in column (2); and Retail Trading PC in column (3). Number of trades are in hundreds, and dollar volumes are in millions. Controls include those described in Table 1 as well as date and firm fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. The sample period is April 2009 to October 2013. Standard errors are clustered by date, t-statistics are in parentheses, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. This table reports sample distribution of ad days, duplicate ad days, and non-duplicate ad days. Panel A tabulates the percentage of firms advertising in the WSJ on calendar days t through t − 6 conditional on placing an ad on day t − 7. Panel B tabulates the number and percentage of ads placed on each weekday and on weekends. This table reports the first-stage regression results of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis on the relation between retail trading and informed trading, using Ad t−7 as an instrument for retail trading. Ad t−7 indicates days with an ad placed seven calendar days earlier in the WSJ. Retail trading is measured using Number of Retail Trades in column (1); Retail Dollar Volume in column (2); and Retail Trading PC in column (3). Number of trades are in hundreds, and dollar volumes are in millions. Controls include those described in Table 1 as well as date and firm fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. The sample period is April 2009 to October 2013. Standard errors are clustered by date, t-statistics are in parentheses, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. This table reports the second-stage regression results of the 2SLS analysis on the relation between retail trading and informed trading, using Ad t−7 as an instrument for retail trading. Retail trading is measured using Number of Retail Trades in column (1); Retail Dollar Volume in column (2); and Retail Trading PC in columns (3) and (4). Informed trading is measured using Number of Informed Trades in columns (1) and (3), and Informed Dollar Volume in columns (2) and (4). Number of trades are in hundreds, and dollar volumes are in millions. Variables with prefix 'Fitted' are the fitted values of their respective variables from the first-stage regressions (see Table 4 ). Controls, in both stages, include those described in Table 1 as well as date and firm fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A. The sample period is April 2009 to October 2013. Standard errors are clustered by date, t-statistics are in parentheses, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 9:30,10:30) [10:30,11:30) [11:30,12:30) [12:30,13:00) [13:00,14:00) [14:00,15:00) [15:00,16 [9:30,10:30) [10:30,11:30) [11:30,12:30) [12:30,13:00) [13:00,14:00) [14:00,15:00) [15:00,16 Table 6 ). Columns (1) through (7) report the results for the time intervals [9:30,10:30), [10:30,11:30), [11:30,12:30), [12:30,13:00), [13:00,14:00), [14:00,15:00), and [15:00,16 :00] ET, respectively. Controls, in both stages, include those described in Table 1 with an ad placed seven calendar days earlier, and requires the same firm to place ads at weekly intervals for equal to or more (less) than three of the prior twelve weeks. OIB$ t,k is the dollar order imbalance on day t for the fiveminute interval k calculated over the eleven five-minute intervals k from 9:30 to 10:25 ET, and Stock Return t,k+1 are stock returns calculated using the midpoints of the best bid and offer over the eleven five-minute intervals k + 1 from 9:35 to 10:30 ET. Controls include those described in Table 1 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 . OIB$ t,k is the dollar order imbalance on day t for the five-minute interval k calculated over the eleven five-minute intervals k from 9:30 to 10:25 ET, and Stock Return t,k+1 are stock returns calculated using the midpoints of the best bid and offer over the eleven five-minute intervals k + 1 from 9:35 to 10:30 ET. Controls include those described in Table 1 of the paper as well as date and firm fixed effects; their coefficient estimates are not reported for brevity. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is April 2009 to October 2013. Standard errors are clustered by date, t-statistics are in parentheses, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. Table IA2 ). Controls, in both stages, include those described in Table 1 of the paper as well as date and firm fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is April 2009 to October 2013. Standard errors are clustered by date, t-statistics are in parentheses, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. Table IA4 ). Controls, in both stages, include those described in Table 1 of the paper as well as date and firm fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A of the paper. The sample period is April 2009 to October 2013. Standard errors are clustered by date, t-statistics are in parentheses, and ***,**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively.
Table IA6 Definition of Variables Used in This Internet Appendix
This table describes the calculation of variables used only in this Internet Appendix. Variables also used in the core analyses are described in Appendix A of the paper. t indexes days, and q indexes the quarter to which day t belongs. Firm subscript is omitted for brevity. To code the ad-related variables, we first align each ad day to a trading day in CRSP, with a non-trading ad day aligned with its first subsequent trading day.
Variable Definition Alternative ad-based instruments Ad t−n
An indicator variable that equals one if day t − n (i.e., n calendar days before trading day t) is an ad day of the firm in the WSJ, and zero otherwise, with n = 5, 6, 8, 9.
Ad t−14
An indicator variable that equals one if day t − 14 (i.e., fourteen calendar days before trading day t) is an ad day of the firm in the WSJ, and zero otherwise. 
